Terry Walker v. Steven Glunt by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-11-2016 
Terry Walker v. Steven Glunt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Terry Walker v. Steven Glunt" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 666. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/666 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
 ALD-324        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1724 
___________ 
 
TERRY WALKER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN GLUNT, Superintendent; DORETTA CHENCHARICK, 
 Supt. Asst./Grievance Coordinator, SCI Houtzdale; CORRECTIONAL 
 OFFICER DIEHL; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER UNCLES; LIEUTENANT GLASS; 
 SHIRLEY MOORE SMEAL, Executive Deputy Secretary of (DOC); JOHN E. 
WETZEL, Secretary of (DOC); CAPTAIN BRAUMBAUCH; HEATHER MOORE, 
Mail Room Supervisor;  PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
(D.O.C.) SCI Houtzdale 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00249) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 30, 2016 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: July 11, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Terry Walker appeals from a district court order granting Appellees’ 
motion for summary judgment.  Because we conclude that this appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Walker, a prisoner at SCI – Frackville acting pro se, filed this action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officer Diehl, Correctional Officer Uncles, 
Lieutenant Glass, and Captain Braumbaugh.1  Walker alleged that, while incarcerated at 
SCI – Houtzdale, they violated his rights provided by the Eighth Amendment by failing 
to protect him when they transferred another inmate, Christian Guzman, into his cell 
knowing that Guzman had threatened to harm him.  Walker’s claims stem from an 
incident that occurred on August 13, 2013.  That morning, Guzman allegedly threatened 
to harm Walker for being a snitch and implied that Diehl was going to assist him.  Walker 
alleged that Diehl and Uncles heard this, but nonetheless transferred Guzman into 
Walker’s cell and uncuffed Guzman, allowing him to assault Walker, who was 
handcuffed behind his back, before returning Guzman to his cell.  Walker also alleged 
that Glass subsequently accused him of fighting with Guzman and that Glass, Diehl, and 
Uncles tried to conceal Guzman’s attack by not allowing medical personnel to take any 
pictures or x-rays of Walker and by not providing him with any medical care other than 
seven stiches he received on his right arm. 
                                                                
1  The other defendants named in the Amended Complaint were dismissed from the 
action pursuant to a motion to dismiss. 
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 Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended granting the motion on all claims and the District Court did so over 
Walker’s objections.  Walker filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the District 
Court denied.  Walker now appeals both District Court orders. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary.  See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  The standard of review for a denial of a motion for 
reconsideration is abuse of discretion.  United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 As an initial matter, in adopting the Magistrate Judge’s thorough Report and 
Recommendation, the District Court correctly held that Walker had failed to produce 
evidence suggesting that Captain Braumbaugh was personally involved or had actual 
knowledge of, and acquiesced to, the commission of any alleged constitutional violation.  
We agree.       
 Here, Walker only broadly alleged that Braumbaugh received his “request slip” 
after the incident, but did not respond.  Walker has not alleged Braumbaugh’s knowledge 
and acquiescence with the required particularity, nor has Walker offered evidence tending 
to show that Braumbaugh had the necessary level of involvement in the underlying 
allegedly unconstitutional conduct for the claim against him to survive summary 
judgment.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 642, 677 (2009); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
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F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff must allege “with appropriate 
particularity” that the defendants “have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs 
[which] . . . can be shown through allegations of personal direction,” and noting that the 
governor’s awareness of plaintiff’s grievances filed with his office of administration is 
insufficient to establish personal involvement in, and actual knowledge of, the conduct 
complained of by plaintiff).  Put more simply, even if one were to assume an incident did 
occur, there is no evidence that Braumbaugh was personally involved in the violation of 
Walker’s constitutional rights. 
 The District Court also properly granted summary judgment to Glass, Diehl, and 
Uncles on the ground that Walker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 
relative to those claims.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a), requires that, before bringing claims with respect to prison conditions under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law, prisoners must first exhaust the administrative 
remedies that are available.  In particular, an inmate must comply with all established 
procedural requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an 
issue.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 
292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 The District Court correctly found that Walker did not exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Evidence of record establishes that Walker did not sign his grievance, an 
important procedural requirement set by the institution.  Moreover, specific evidence 
shows that the grievance was signed by another inmate known for being litigious.  
Walker’s response is to assert that the prison officials are not handwriting experts.  
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However, scientific expertise is not necessary in this instance.  The finding was upheld on 
multiple levels of grievance review and Walker put forth no actual evidence to contradict 
it at summary judgment.2  Walker acknowledges that this was the basis for the rejection 
of his grievance, as opposed to some other reason without basis in fact.  In short, Walker 
cannot escape the grievance he submitted and the signature it bore.  By filing a 
procedurally defective grievance and appeal, Walker failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Summary judgment was therefore properly granted on Walker’s claims against 
Glass, Diehl, and Uncles.3 
III. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants 
summary judgment on Walker’s complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We 
will also affirm the denial of Walker’s motion for reconsideration.  Given our disposition 
of this appeal, we grant Walker’s Motion for Leave to Proceed on Original Record and 
deny his Motion for Appointment of Counsel.  
                                                                
2 On appeal, Walker essentially takes issue with the process employed by prison officials.  
For example, he argues that the defendants have never properly explained where prison 
policy makes an improper signature a reason for rejecting a grievance.  However, by 
making the signature a required element of the grievance form, prison officials did just 
that. 
3 Summary judgment was also properly granted on the claim that Glass, Diehl, and 
Uncles “conspired” to have Walker’s grievance rejected.  “To constitute a conspiracy, 
there must be a ‘meeting of the minds.’”  Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 
205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970)).  
Walker offered nothing more than conclusory statements that these officials conspired to 
reject his grievance; no evidence suggests that they agreed, plotted, or even discussed 
doing so. 
